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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a Motion to Modify Divorce Decree
brought by the defendant (R.84) wherein defendant sought to have
the original Decree of Divorce (entered herein on October 5,
1972) (R.24-27) modified by having child support money reduced.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson in two days of trial, the first on January 23, 1979,
and the final day of trial approximately eleven months later
on December 4, 1979.
At the conclusion of the trial, after having takenthe
case under-advisement, the trial court ordered that the Decree
of Divorce originally entered in this action, together with
paragraphs C, D and E or a prior Order Modifying the Decree
(which was entered on November 30, 1977, R.60-65) be modified.
By the terms of the Decree of Divorce and the aforesaid modif ication, defendant was, prior to the instant proceeding ordered
to pay the plaintiff a fixed amount of child support money of
$1,000 per month ($166.66 per month for each of six children of
the parties), together with an additional amount of child support in the event his income exceeded a certain minimum.

The

Court modified the aforesaid provisions by requiring defendant
to pay to plaintiff $1,110 per month ($185 per child), to be
reduced to $1,000 per month when the first of the parties 1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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children ceased to be entitled to child support (hence $200
per child per month at that time) , and the Court deleted
entirely the aforesaid provision providing for supplemental
child support in the event defendant's income exceeded said
minimum.
In addition, the Court defined the term "fulltime
student" as being a child in school and carrying the number of
hours that the particular institution defines as a fulltime
student, and the Court ordered that the modification date was
to be effective on the day it was signed, to-wit, April 18,
1980.

(R.130-131)
Plaintiff has appealed from the Order of April 18,

1980.

(R.132)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the aforesaid Order Modifying

Decree of Divorce entered April 18, 1980, reversed, and to have
child support payments governed as provided in the original
Decree of Divorce entered October 5, 1972, as modified by the
aforesaid Order and Order Modifying Decree entered November 30,
1977.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original Decree of Divorce (R.24-27) was entered
pursuant to stipulation (R.10-13) (except as to grounds).
provided, among other things, that a fixed monthly child

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It

-3-

support for each of the six children of the parties was to be
paid by defendant to plaintiff, and in addition, provided for
a supplemental amount of child support which would be variable
and which would be determined in accordance with the following
formula.

We quote from paragraph 9 of the Decree:

"9.
It is ordered that in the event defendant's
net income from his dental practice exceeds $24,000
per year (before income taxes, but after professional
dues and equipment and other like expenses of his profession), plaintiff is awarded as child support, in
addition to the $12,000 per year hereinabove provided for, one-half of the excess of said net income
over $24,000 after deduction from said net income of
an amount equal to the income tax attributable to
such increase.
Thus, for example, if in a given
year, the defendant's net income before income
taxes, but after professional dues and equipment
and other like expenses of his profession, is
$26,000, the excess over $24,000 in this instance
is $2,000, from which an amount would be deducted
which is equal to the income tax attributable to
said $2,000 (being the income tax on $26,000 less
what the income tax would have been on $24,000),
and the plaintiff shall receive one-half of the
remaining balance after said income tax on said
excess is deducted from said $2,000.
Defendant is
ordered to furnish to plaintiff access at all reasonable times and places to his records.
It is ordered
that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply
until the expiration of sixteen months after the
date of the aforesaid Stipulation and Consent, that
date being October 12, 1972."
On April 22, 1977, plaintiff initiated an Order to
Show Cause proceeding against the defendant to have the supplemental child support money which had accrued under the aforesaid
paragraph 9 of the Decree of Divorce reduced to judgment inasmuch as the same had not yet been paid by the defendant.

On

June 8, 1977, the defendant filed a Motion to Modify Decree of
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Divorce (R.39) supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R.36-37) and an Affidavit (R.38).

Both the Motion to

Modify Decree of Divorce (which is referred to hereinafter as
the first modification proceeding) and the aforesaid Order to
Show Cause were heard by Honorable David K. Winder on the 19th
day of September, 1977, and after a hearing on those issues,
Judge Winder entered his Order on November 30, 1977 (R.60-64).
At that time the Court reduced to judgment the arrears of child
support money which had accrued under the aforesaid paragraph9
in the amount of $4,455.50 ($103.50 for 1974; $1,486.40for1975;
and $2,963.50 for 1976).

The Court at that time ruled on the

constitutional issue raised by the defendant (which is not
involved in the present appeal proceeding) and finally in
paragraphs C, D and E of that Order (R.62,63,64) modified the
aforesaid paragraph 9 by providing that the supplemental child
support money was to be computed by reference to the

defendan~s

federal income tax returns as opposed to general records, provided for the mechanics of defendant's furnishing information
to the plaintiff in order to compute the supplemental amount of
child support money, and provided that the paragraph 9 formula,
although it would remain the same for computing the supplemental
child support, would be reduced by one-sixth as each of the
children of the parties ceased to be entitled to child support
money.

We set forth paragraphs C, D and E in full for the con-

venience of the Court:
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"C.
The first sentence of paragraph 9 of the
said Decree of Divorce is modified to read as follows:
"'IT IS ORDERED that in the event defendant's net
income from his dental practice exceeds $24,000.00 per
year as declared on his federal income tax return
(before income taxes, but after professional dues and
equipment and other like expenses of his profession) ,
plaintiff is awarded as child support, in addition to
the $12,000.00 per year hereinabove provided for, onehalf of the excess of said net income over $24,000.00
after deduction from said net income of an amount
equal to the income tax attributable to such increase.'
"The remainder of paragraph 9 shall remain in full
force and effect as presently set forth in the Decree
of Divorce.
It is thus the intention of the Court
that in determining additional child support, if any,
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the said Decree of Divorce,
the parties shall refer to the items set forth in the
federal tax return, and not to extraneous items which
have not been incorporated in the return.
Nevertheless
defendant is not precluded from making bona fide amendments to his tax returns, and in the event of such a
bona fide amendment, the defendant shall be entitled
to an appropriate adjustment.
The Court notes that
currently the relevant schedule to be used in determining defendant's liability, if any, under paragraph
9 of the Decree of Divorce as amended is the Federal
Schedule C.

"D. IT IS ORDERED that hereafter the defendant
furnish to the plaintiff copies of state and federal
returns within two weeks after they are filed.
Plaintiff will then have two weeks after receipt thereof
in which to submit to the defendant the amount of
additional child support which plaintiff contends is
owing under the Decree of Divorce as modified.
Defendant shall have two weeks from receipt of notice of
said claimed amount in which to serve notice of
objection thereto.
If no such notice of objection
is served within that two-week period, the sum submitted by plaintiff to defendant shall stand as the
amount owing to the plaintiff by the defendant as and
for additional child support.
However, if the claimed
sum is denied, then either party shall have the right
to apply to the court for a hearing to determine the
proper amount of additional child support money, if any.
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"E.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that increased child
support money as provided in paragraph 9 of the Decree
of Divorce as amended shall be deemed payable onesixth (1/6) for each of the children of the parties.
Thus, although the method for computing the total
additional child support under paragraph 9 of the
Decree of Divorce as amended shall remain constant,
the amount actually paiq by defendant to the plaintiff will be subject to appropriate reduction as the
children cease to be entitled to child support in
accordance with the other provisions of the Decree
of Divorce."
On February 17, 1978, less than three months after
entry of the first Order Modifying Decree of Divorce (referred
to above) , the defendant filed another Motion for Modification
of Decree (R.84) supported by an Affidavit (R.81-83).

That

Affidavit was supplemented by a second Affidavit filed Decernber 5, 1978 (R. 94-99) .
We will deal with the allegations of this Motion in
detail under Point I hereafter.

However, for present purposes

it will suffice to point out that the thrust of defendant's
argument was that, although his gross income had increased
from approximately $55,326 in 1972 to $92,359 in 1977, his percentage of profit had decreased, although his net income had
increased from $26,808 in 1972 to $31,324 in 1977.
Plaintiff's answer to defendant's position was set
forth in an instrument entitled Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modification and was supported by an Affidavit
(R.88-91).

The thrust of plaintiff's defense was:
1.

That the petition was barred by the principles
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res judicata;
2.

That the petition failed to state a claim against

the plaintiff upon which relief could be granted, i.e., failed
to allege grounds justifying a modification;

3.

That there was no sufficient change of circum-

stances in any event.
The second Petition for Modification was heard by the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, on January 23, 1979, and
testimony was concluded on December 4, 1979.

In its modification

the Court deleted the provisions for supplemental child support
money and substituted in its place an order that the defendant
pay to plaintiff $185 per month child support money for each
child, to be increased to $200 per month per child when one of
the children is no longer entitled to support payments.

As

noted above, the Court also defined the term "fulltime student"
and decreed the changes to be effective April 18, 1980 (R.130-

131) .
The transcript of testimony from the trial on January

23, 1979, is hereinafter referred to as "T" and the testimony
from the hearing on December 4, 1979, is hereinafter referred
to as "2T".
The defendant testified that he knew of the problem
which was the basis for his second Motion for Modification at
least as early as 1976 (T.26,T.58).
At the commencement of trial on the second day,
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December 4, 1979, the Court ruled in effect that events transpiring prior to the date of the trial of the first Petition for
Modification (September 19, 1977) were res judicata and would
not be admissible in this proceeding.

However, the Court ruled

that inasmuch as the defendant's finances for 1977 were not
fully known to him at that time, the Court would allow testimony with regard to his financial situation throughout the
entire year of 1977 (2T.3;2T.30;2T.52).

Thereafter the trial

was basically restricted to a consideration of the change of
circumstances between 1977 and 1979.

In this connection, it

should be noted that the Court admitted into evidence defendant's financial records for the first six months of 1979 over
plaintiff's objections (2T.57).

Objection was made because

these records were not part of defendant's pleadings and had
not been furnished to plaintiff's counsel prior to the trial.
The Court erred in admitting the same.

Also there

was no showing that defendant 1 s financial records ror

thefi~st

half of 1977 were not available to defendant as of Septemberl9,
1977.

We desire now to summarize the testimony with regard
to the alleged change of circumstances between 1977 and 1979 as
follows:
The defendant's financial records (which set forth the
facts in this connection) are found in Exhibit P-2, which is
defendant's tax records for 1977, Exhibit 8-P, which consists
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which consists of defendant's income tax records for 1978, and
Exhibit D-4, which consists of a summary of defendant's testimony regarding his income for the first six months of 1979.
In addition, after the Court's ruling that matters prior to

1977 were inadmissible, Exhibit D-1 remained viable only with
regard to the information set forth for 1977, and in addition,
an exhibit prepared by the plaintiff, Exhibit 11-P, was ad.mi tted
in evidence with regard to the year 1977 only and shows the
defendant's 1977 income, including his percentage of profit as
claimed by the defendant and also how those figures would appear
if a salary of $8,000 paid by the defendant to his second wife
in 1977 were considered as defendant's own income, and we will
discuss that matter further hereafter.
Defendant's Income.
The following is a summary of defendant's earnings for
1977, .1978 and 1979:
1979 (first
six months)

1979 (projected
for twelve months)

1977

1978

$92,359

$82,395

Overhead

61,035

55,961

24,890.20

49,780.40

Net
Income

31,324

26,434

17,214.09

34,428.18

Gross
Income

$84.208.58

In addition to his dental practice, the defendant
testified that he taught a corrununity education course, frornwhich
he had a small income (2T.29).

The defendant also testified that
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he invested $25 per month in an investment club (2T.90).
The defendant remarried in 1976 (T. 9,10) and has two
children by this second marriage (2T.28).

Defendant's second

wife had earnings of $12,473 in 1977 (Exhibit P-2) and defendant testified that $8,000 of that sum was paid by defendant to
his wife as a salary for services allegedly rendered by her £or
(2T.84)
him~
Defendant's second wife had income in 1978 of $9,890
(Exhibit 8-P) and defendant testified that $8,400 of this sum
was paid to her by the defendant for alleged services (2T.84).
Defendant did not testify to the amount he paid his
wife in 1979, but stated that it would be less than $10,000
(2T.45).

The salary paid to defendant's second wife by defend-

ant was listed in 1977 in the figure for his general

office~~e=-

head, but was listed as a separate item in 1978 {2T.81).
Defendant testified that he works as a dentist in a
clinic in Granger and that the clinic provides generally for his
needs, does the billing for him, and collects his accounts (2T.
77-78).

He stated that his wife did not work at the clinic, but

wrote some checks for him at home, called on some bad accounts,
and kept records for him at home, although the exact nature of
that record-keeping was not

d~sclosed

(T.48).

At 2T.47 the defendant stated that: "I pay my wife a
salary so that I can make an end run on the clause that is in
the decree."

At 2T.84 defendant testified with regard to the

services performed by his wife, and we set forth the following
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from the transcript:
"Q

What services did she render?

A

As far as I am concerned it is relative.
I have
already stated to the Court I pay her so that I
can live.

Q

Do you consider that, the money you paid your
wife, was really income to yourself?

A

That is possible.

Q

You don't pretend she did any specific things?

A

She does do some things.
worth $8,000."

I don't know it is

In referring to the employment of his wife, defendant's
own counsel in closing argument at 2T.129 referred to defendant
as not being "straight arrow" and e.gain on page 2T. 13 0, ref erred
to the arrangement as a "sham."
Plaintiff's Income.
Plaintiff testified that she remarried on May 12, 1979
(2T.S)·, and with regard to the children of the parties, she·testified that five were still at home and one was attending college
at Utah State University (2T.142).

She stated that her only

income was approximately $200, which she received from sale of
an asset she had owned in 1977 (2T.26-27).

She testified that

she had borrowed $34,000 in 1975 and that that sum was owing in
1977 (2T.15), and that the said $200 per month was paid or was
available to be applied on the aforesaid indebtedness of $34,000
( 2T. 2 6) •

The plaintiff testified that in 1977 she was receiving
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church welfare which consisted of food and utility bills, and
that the sum of approximately $1,800 was paid by the Church for
her other expenses between April 1977 and November 1977 (2T.17;
2T.19).

She stated that she was unemployed in 1977 and also at

the time of the trial, but that she had worked briefly from February of 1978 to October 1978 (2T.6).

She also testified that

her present husband was now paying her expenses and contributed
to the home approximately the amount which his presence added
to household expenses (2T.8).
Insurance.
Defendant was ordered toRmaintain for the benefit of
the children of the parties the life insurance which he had at
the time of the divorce and also health and accident insurance
(see paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, R.26).

The defend-

ant testified that this life insurance was not a term policy,
but rather a policy whereby he was building up an equity for
his retirement.

He further testified that the cost of the life

insurance had not changed at all since the time of the Decree
2T.106), but that his health and accident insurance increased
from $450.84 in 1977 to $840 in 1979 (2T.33}, but it still did
not cost him anymore to have his children by his f

i~st

marriage

included in the policy along with his present wife and the two
children by his second marriage (2T.76}.

Thus, even if defend-

ant were not required to provide that benefit to the children
of his first marriage, there would be no savings to him thereby.
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The defendant testified that he was providing a disability insurance for the benefit of the children of his first
marriage, although he testified that the disability insurance
runs only to him (T.55).

The Decree of Divorce does not

require defendant to provide or maintain disability insurance.
Self-Employment Tax.
Defendant's self-employment tax in 1977 was $1,304,
in 1978 was $1,434, and he testified that in 1979 his selfemployment tax would be $1,700 (2T.52).
The defendant was asked to give his reasons for seeking
a modification of the Decree· of Divorce.

In addition to the afore-

said matters relating to change of circumstances, defendant testified substantially that his reasons for seeking modification
of the Decree of Divorce were:
1.

That it was inequitable and unworkable and that

it required him to have an accountant and plaintiff to have an
accountant with a potential for disagreement (2T.38).
2.
of Divorce:
pay that."

Defendant stated that under the original Decree
"Under this thing I am unable to show that I

can't

(T.40)
Defendant's own expert witness, a certified public

accountant by the name of James W. Anderson, testified as follows
when he was asked whether the fonnula under the Decree of Divorce
as modified was workable.

He stated at T.70:

"It's workable,

but it takes time to make the calculations, but it is a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wor~able

-14-

calculation."
Defendant also testified at T.59 when asked whether
in each year from 1972 to 1976 a dollar figure had been arrived
at under the formula as follows:

"Well, it had been arrived at,

because her accountant did it, yes."
Fulltirne Student Issue.
The plaintiff testified that since August 1979 defendant had reduced her child support money by the sum of $166 per
month, claiming that one of the children was not a fulltirne student (2T20-21) .

With regard to that issue the Court ruled that

the propriety of defendant's deducting $166 per month from the
plaintiff's child support would not be ruled on in this proceed(2T.23)
ing as it was· not before the Court/. By reason of the Court's
ruling, no-evidence was introduced on that issue.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court in its final
Order defined "full time student" and ruled in paragraph 2 (R.131)
as follows:
"It is· further ordered that a child shall be considered a fulltime student when such child is in shoal
and carrying the number of hours that the institution
defines as a fulltime student. The foregoing provision is intended to apply to a normal school year
of approximately nine months.
If a child complies
with the foregoing provisions, the child support
money shall be paid for such child during the normal
summer vacation of three months, even though such
child is not in school during the said summer
vacation."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE
GROUNDS JUSTIFYING MODIFICATION AND AS BEING BARRED
BY THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA.
Defendant's Motion to Modify Divorce Decree (R.84),

which is the subject of the present proceeding, sought to achieve
a modification of the original Decree of Divorce by showing an
alleged change of circumstances between the time of the entry of
the original Decree on October 25, 1972, and the time of the
filing of the said Motion, to-wit, February 17, 1978, notwithstanding that a prior Motion for Modification brought by the
defendant had just been disposed of by Order of the District
Court of Salt Lake County entered November 30, 1977 (R.60-64).
The plaintiff claims that the second Motion for Modification was
barred by the principles of res judicata as to events prior to
the first modification proceeding.

Res judicata would of neces-

sity preclude the second Motion for Modification from stating a
claim with regard to events prior to November 30, 1977.

The

sufficiency of the allegations of said Motion would thus have
to be tested with regard to the period beginning November 30,
1977, and ending on the date the second Motion was filed, which
was February 17, 1978, or at most to December 5, 1978, when a
Supplemental Affidavit was filed by the defendant.

(R. 94-95).

The defenses of res judicata and failure to state a
claim were raised by the plaintiff in her answer to defendant's
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second Motion for Modification [which answer was actually
entitled Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modification (R.88), which was supported by an Affidavit (R.90-91) .]
In asserting the aforesaid defenses, plaintiff sought
to dismiss defendant's Motion for Modification at the outset.
These Motions were incorporated in a Memorandum which was served
upon defendant's counsel on the first day of trial, January 23,
(R.111-114)
1979, at which time it was filed with the court~ (The Memorand~~
was apparently not placed in the file by the Court until October
26, 1979.)

At the conclusion of these arguments, the Court took

that matter under advisement and gave the defendant ten days to
reply.

(It was anticipated by the Court and the parties that

the case could not be finished as to the evidence in one day and
would have to be concluded on a separate day in the event further evidence was required.

The case was set for further

hear:~;

on April 13, 1979, and notice thereof was served February 5, 1979,
but the actual concluding day of trial was not held until December 4, 1979.)

In any event defendant never did file a response

to said Memorandum within ten days, or otherwise.

(See Minute

entry R.100 regarding these events.)
It is plaintiff's contention that the said Motion to
Dismiss should have been granted, both on the merits and for
failure of the defendant to respond on January 23, 1979, or at
least ten days (approximately) thereafter.
As to the matter of res judicata, it should be noted
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that the Decree of Divorce in this action was entered on the
25th day of October, 1972 (R.24-28).

It was entered pursuant

to stipulation signed by the parties and their counsel (R.1013) .

As noted in the Statement of Facts the Decree contains a

provision with respect to child support fixing an amount certain and also providing for a supplemental amount in the event
that the defendant's income should increase above a specified
minimum as set forth in the Statement of Facts.

Those pro-

visions of the Decree are set forth in the Statement of Facts
at page 3 of this brief, so we will not repeat them at this
point.
A careful reading of those provisions shows that the

clause providing for a supplemental amount of child support was
before the Court in 1977 and was, in fact, modified in at least
three respects:

Federal tax records were to be used as opposed

to gen.eral records; mechanics of ascertaining the additional
amount were spelled out; and provision for handling that clause
as the children ceased one by one to be entitled to child support were set forth.
It thus appears clear that the first modification
hearing fully considered the matter of the supplemental child
support clause and amended it extensively.

Although defendant

did not at that time raise the matters contained in his second
Motion for Modification, those items could, and should, have
been raised (except perhaps for the three-month period between
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November 30, 1977, and February 17, 1978, when the second Motion
for Modification was filed) .
By reason of the failure of the Court to grant plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, substantially all of the testimony of
the first day ·of trial on January 21, 1979, was irrelevant as it
was devoted to testimony relating to the exhibit which was
attached to defendant's Supplemental Affidavit (R.94-99), which
exhibit was introduced in evidence as Exhibit D-2 over plaintiff's objection.

That exhibit dealt with events transpiring

between the years of 1972 and 1977.

Only 1977 was relevant.

At the conunencement of the second day of trial on
December 4, 1979, the Court in effect granted plaintiff's Motion
on the matter of res judicata by ruling that evidence prior to
the hearing in the first modification proceedings (September 17,
1977, was irrelevant and would be precluded, except the Court
allowed testimony of the defendant's income for the entire year
of 1977 on the theory that as of the hearing on September 19,
1977, all of the information relating to the defendant's 1977
income was not known.
Thus, although the Trial Court upheld plaintiff's contention of res judicata as of January 1, 1977, we believe that
the Court should have upheld the defense of res judicata as of
the time of the Court's Order of November 30, 1977, or at least
as of September 19, 1977, for all purposes.

First of all, since

defendant was permitted to introduce testimony of the first one-
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half of 1979, he should have been held to the same standard
in 1977, as there was no showing that his financial records
for at least the first one-half of 1977 were not available to
him.

Second, it is the date of the Order of Modification that

appears to be controlling.
At 18 ALR 2d, page 18, the following statement is
set forth:
"Where there have been one or more previous
decisions on motions for modification of a decree,
the question whether there has been a substantial
change in the circumstances of the parties is
determined with respect to the period commencing
with the date of the most recent order on a motion
for modification and not with respect to the time
since the original decree was entered."
(Emphasis
added)
In Hudson v. Hudson, 8 Wash 2d 114, 111 P2d 573 (1941),
the appellant in 1938 petitioned for an award of alimony (the
\

court having reserved jurisdiction on that matter) .

At that

hearing the court held that there was not sufficient change of
circumstances and denied the application.

The appellant again

brought a similar motion in 1940, which was denied, and the
appellant appealed from that 1940 order.

The court held that

the issue was whether or not there was a change of circumstances
since the 1938 order, not since the entry of the original decree.
At page 574 the court said:
"The order made preceding the one which is now
before us not having been appealed from is res judicata, unless there has been, since that order was
entered, a material change in the circumstances
of the parties."
(Emphasis added)
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In 24 Am Jur2d§676, Divorce and Separation, the
following statement is found at page 795:
"Where the court has entertained and decided one
petition for modification, the order entered in that
proceeding is res judicata, so that one cannot maintain
a second petition for modification unless he can show
that since the entry of· the order on the first petition
for modification there has been a substantial change
of circumstances."
(Emphasis added)
In Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Ut 216, 198 P2d 233 (1948),
this court considered the same question.

In that case the

defendant claimed that he entered into a stipulation prior to
the decree of divorce regarding alimony based upon the representation of his attorney that he could later get it reduced.

The

court held that the defendant was in effect seeking to have the
original decree modified because it was claimed to be unfair and
not because of any change of circumstances.

The court held that

the defendant was precluded from obtaining a change in the decree
since .there was no change of circumstances which would warrant
that relief.

The court stated at page 224:

"What defendant is really contending is that the
alimony awarded by the interlocutory divorce decree
was excessive. His proper remedy would have been to
appeal from that decree. A petition for modification
is not the proper way to have changed the terms of an
erroneous alimony decree.
In point of fact, defendant is in a poor position
to complain. He stipulated to an alimony decree of
$250 per month, apparently without any expection of
ever complying with it. He is hardly in a favorable
position now to assert that the alimony awarded is
excessive."
It seems clear that the instant case is almost
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identical with Osmus.

The defendant's principal contention

is that the original divorce provision is not fair to him and
not really that there has been any change of circumstances.
We do not believe that the facts support either contention.
Defendant has not appealed the Court's ruling on the
question of res judicata, and we take it therefor that at the
very least, events prior to January 1, 1977, are precluded from
consideration.

Events prior to November 30, 1977, are likewise

barred, we believe, and urge this court to so hold.
Further, we therefore take it that in canvassing the
pleadings of the defendant to determine whether they state grounds
for modification, they will be tested by the period from Novernber 30, 1977,

(or September 19, 1977, to December 5, 1978, or at

most from January 1, 1977, to December 4, 1979).

We do not

believe that in either time period the defendant's pleadings
state .grounds for modification.
Prior to actual examination of defendant's pleadings,
we desire to observe the following:

It has long been the lawin

this state that a modification of a decree of divorce cannot be
granted unless there is a material and permanent chanqe of circumstances since the preceding order.

In Carson v. Carson, 87Ut

1, 47 P2d 894 (1935), the court stated at page 4:
"In a proper case the amount of alimony awarded
in a decree of divorce may be changed.
R.S.Utah 1933,
40-3-5. The party to a divorce proceeding, however,
is not entitled to a modification of the decree of
divorce in the absence of a showing that there has
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been a material and permanent change of conditions
since the entry of the decree."
(Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the
petition seeking modification must allege grounds for change.
In Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Ut 570, 47 P2d 419 (1935), at page
420 this court stated:
"It is well settled in this court that in order
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the moving
party must allege and prove changed conditions arising
since the entry of the decree which require, under
rules of equity and justice, a change in the decree."
(Emphasis added)
And again in Jones v. Jones, 104 Ut 274, 139 P2d 222,
(1943), the defendant husband sought modification of a decree
with respect to alimony, and the court held at page 278:
"In the instant case there is no pleading which
would justify the finding made by the court 'that the
sum of $50 a month is necessary for the proper maintenance and support of the plaintiff, Fuxia E. Jones.'"
(Emphasis added)
In the light of the foregoing principles, we desire to
briefly review the allegations of defendant's pleadings in connection with the Motion to Modify Divorce Decree.

The said

Motion itself (R.84) states as follows:
"Comes now the defendant by and through his
attorney and moves the Court for an Order modifying
the Decree of Divorce entered herein on October 25,
1972. This motion is based upon the Affidavit
attached hereto."
There is not even an allegation there with regard to
material or permanent change of circumstances.
We turn next to the Affidavit filed in support of the
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aforesaid Motion found in the record at pages 81 to 83.

In

that Affidavit at page 3 the defendant alleges a "substantial
change of circumstances," and in seven subparagraphs numbered
"a" to "g" the defendant sets forth the alleged changes.

We

will quote the relevant parts of each subparagraph:
"a.
At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered
the parties reasonably contemplated an increase in
income resulting from the defendant's practice of dentistry.
The parties did not, however, contemplate that
the defendant's income would increase 100% over a
period of six years.
Defendant's income in fact has
increased approximately 100%.
It was the contemplation
of the parties that in the event the defendant's income
did increase substantially, unpredictably and unforseeably that an adjustment in the method of computation
would be appropriate."
Conunent:

The foregoing paragraph deals with a six-

year period beginning at the time of the Decree of Divorce and·
is thus barred by the principles of res judicata.

Even aside
\

from that, it is difficult to imagine how an increase of income
over 100% can result in grounds for reduction of child support.
Burthermore, it is clear that the parties contemplated that the
defendant's income would increase; otherwise there would have
been no point in stipulating to an additional amount as child
support in the event defendant's income increased.
"b. The costs of operation of the defendant's
dentistry practice has increased substantially since
the Decree of Divorce was entered, while the profit
that he realizes has not increased in a like fashion.
That the increase in the defendant's.income was substantial and unf orseeable and has in fact not provided defendant with the same margin of profit
heretofore realized."
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Cormnent:

Paragraph b deals with the same period of

time, 1972 to 1977, and is thus barred by res judicata.

Further-

more, it is not the defendant's profit margin that is relevant,
but rather his income.

Paragraph b alleges an increase in

income, and that appears to preclude further inquiry into that
subject.

In the case of Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P2d

620 (1972) the trial court made a finding:
"That since the divorce Mr. F's costs of doing
business has substantially increased, as has his income,
but not commensurate therewith."
The Supreme Court rejected that finding as a basis for
a modification of the decree and stated:
"Nothing is reflected in this finding that would
indicate that Mr. F's income had decreased so that he
was reasonably unable to pay what he agreed or to
justify the wiping our of a $12,000 per year alimony
award, and we are unimpressed with such generalized,
unspecific finding in this case." (p. 108)
"c. That it reasonably was contemplated by the
parties that the plaintiff would on the expiration
of a reasonable time seek gainful employment to
assist and participate in the monetary aspects of
rearing the parties minor children. The plaintiff
has never attempted to seek gainful employment and
has in fact relied on child support as her sole and
singular source of income, said income for her own
support and the support of the parties children.
That the plaintiff's failure to seek and secure
gainful employment is a substantial change in
circumstances as those circumstances were fairly
and reasonably contemplated by the parties at the
time the Decree of Divorce was entered."
Conunent:

The foregoing allegations are likewise

barred by res judicata.

It shoud further be noted that plain-

tiff was unemployed at the time of the divorce and unemployed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

at the time of the first modification hearing and at the time
of the second modification hearing, which would appear to be a
circumstance which would not help the defendant in any event.
During the trial the Trial Court properly ruled that
what was contemplated by the parties prior to the Decree of
Divorce was irrelevant and that the.case was governed by the
written agreement (Stipulation), and for the same reasons, allegations as to what was contemplated are irrelevant (T.22)
"d. At the time the Decree was entered it was
fairly contemplated that either or both plaintiff
and defendant might re-marry.
Subsequent to the
divorce plaintiff did re-marry and then subsequently divorce her second husband, realizing
from the second divorce a very substantial award
of the second marital estate, the quantom of which
award was not contemplated fairly by either plaintiff or defendant at the time of the 1972 Decree
and plaintiff's interest as prescribed by the Court
attendant her second divorce represents a very
substantial change in her circumstances.
....

"That the defendant has re-married and is
presently 42 years of age. That the defendant's
re-marriage was contemplated, however, the
defendant's wife is pregnant and will give birth
to a child on or about·June 12, 1978. The birth
of the child was not contemplated by either plaintiff or defendant the time the Decree was entered
in view of the fact that the plaintiff and defendant had six children of their marriage and
additionallv
in view of the parties
aaes. The
defendant's expected child constitutes a substantial change in circumstances."

-

Comment:

To begin with, the fact of defendant's

remarriage is irrelevant.

Felt v. Felt, supra, held at page 108:

The fact of remarriage cannot be used in
determining modification of an alimony award, although
in some conceivable rare care it might, and we are at
11
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&

a loss to know why the trial court so found, unless
it was on account of what was said in Callister v.
Callister, supra, which recited the fact of remarriage, which we disaffirm if it is urged that such
fact is admissible for the purposes of reducing
the alimony award in the instant case."
Furthermore, the aforesaid paragraph d is barred by

res judicata and there is no allegation of any change of circumstances since the prior hearing of November 30, 1977, or
for that matter September 19, 1977.

The fact of plaintiff's

remarriage is likewise irrelevant on the question of child support inasmuch as the second husband has no obligation for the
support of the defendant's children.

The allegations that no

other children of a subsequent marriage was contemplated is not
only irrelevant, but unbelievable.
"e. That the 1972 Decree provided for generous
and reasonable rights of visitation, which visitation
was contemplated by both parties to include overnight
and uninterrupted summer visitation.
That the plaintiff has constantly, consistently and intentionally
since the parties divorce denied the defendant reasonable rights of visitation and plaintiff's conduct
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances."
Comment:

The said paragraph is barred by res judicata.

Furthermore, visitation problems, even if they exist, have no
relevancy as to reasonable child support, particularly where
there is no issue of custody or change-thereof.

"f. That the 1972 Decree provided that defendant
provide health and accident insurance for the benefit
of the minor children, it was not contemplated by the
parties that health and accident insurance would
increase to a substantial sum said health insurance
now represents and that that increase in insurance is
significant and a substantial change in circumstances."
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Comment:

This allegation is barred by res judicata.

What was "contemplated" is barred by the written Stipulation and
Decree entered pursuant thereto.
"g. That subsequent to the Decree the defendant
purchased policies of disability insurance to provide
for the support of his children in the event he was
disabled and thus unable to earn a living. That this
additional expense to defendant is substantial, for
the benefit of the minor children and constitutes a
significant change of circumstances."
Comment:

This allegation is not only barred by res

judicata, but the Decree of Divorce nowhere requires defendant
to provide disability insurance, and if he does so, it is voluntary on his part and constitutes no basis for a modification of
the Decree.
On December 5, 1978, defendant filed a Supplemental
Affidavit in support of his Motion for Modification, and we will
review the allegations thereof briefly.
allegations

is

The substance of those

contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 thereof,

which we set forth verbatum:
"l. That since February 1978, the date of
defendant's last Affidavit, there has transpired and
taken place additional changes which in fact are significant and substantial, which further reflect a
substantial change of circumstances as required
and contemplated by 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated.
"2. That subsequent to the determination of
the defendant's 1977 tax situation, defendant has
learned that his gross profit has been significantly reduced from that which existed at the time
of the divorce and all years subsequent.
"3. That during the year 1977 the proportion
of the defendant's net income which he realizes has
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decreased substantially since the date of divorce
and all years thereafter, which was not contemplated by the parties."
Comment:

It appears that defendant is saying that

since he filed his petition he has found out that his net income
between 1972 and 1977 has decreased.
of the principle of res judicata.

That is irrelevant in view

Furthermore, it is not car-

rect because the defendant alleges in the petition filed February 17, 1978, that his net income decreased betwen 1972 and
1977.

(See paragraph b set forth on page 23 of this brief.)Furthermore, as noted above, the defendant's gross

profit is irrelevant; it is any material and permanent increase
or decrease in his income which is relevant.

There is no alle-

gation that the defendant's income has decreased and that he is
thereby no longer able to pay the support money as originally
ordered by the Court.
Attached to the Affidavit is a four-page exhibit which
was introduced into evidence over plaintiff's objection at the
trial as Exhibit 1-D.

Even.considering that exhibit as a plead-

ing, it does not state a cause of action for amendment of the
Decree because it constitutes a comparison of income betweenl972
and 1977 and the intervening years, and all of the years prior to
1977 are precluded from such consideration.

If one is to con-

sider the material allged as to 1977 as being relevant, since
there is no other year with which to compare that data in the
pleadings, it is meaningless and cannot be the basis for
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alleging a change of circumstances.
Thus, all of the aforesaid allegations as they
relate to the period 1972 to November 1, 1977, (or at least
January 1, 1977, are barred from consideration, and since the
pleadings therefor only allege matters relating to 1977, there
are no allegations in this case which could possibly constitute
a valid grounds for modification, and the Motion for Modification should have been dismissed at the outset.

POINT II.·

THERE HAS BEEN NO SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMST.Al.'1CES
BETWEEN THE FIRST MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND THE SECOND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION TO JUSTIFY GRANTING THE
SECOND MOTION.
A sununary of the evidence in this regard reveals that

the defendant's net income went from $31,324 in 1977 up to the
sum of $34,428 in 1979,

(if we project his income for the

first half of the year for the entire year, and there appears
to be no other reasonable wav of comoarina incomes in those two
-

years.)

-

J

It is true that defendant's net income went down to

$26,434 in 1978, but that was obviously only a temporary reduction in income and was by no means a permanent reduction.

In

addition, if we disregard the "sham" of defendant's paying his
own wife a salary for substantially no services rendered, the
defendant's net income in 1977 is increased to $39,324, and in
1978 it is increased to $34,834, and in 1979, would be increased
by a sum less than $10, 000, but presumably at least equal to the
1978 figure of $8,400, which would increase defendant's net
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income in 1979 to at least $42,828.
In addition, at the time of trial, the defendant was

receiving an additional income from a teaching position, although
the amount thereof was not disclosed.
On the other hand, plaintiff had no income except the
sum of approxirnat2ly $200 which she was receiving monthly from
the sale of an asset which she owned in 1977, which sum was used
(or at least available) to liquidate a $34,000 debt incurred by
her in 1975 and existing in 1977.

Plaintiff's seconc husband

was supporting her and contributing to the household only enough
to cover his own expenses.

Plaintiff's second husband was not

supporting the children of plaintiff and defendant, and indeed
had no obligation to do so.
The only other relevant items were (1) the life insurance, the annual cost of which had not changed at all since 1972;
(2) the health and accident insurance which, although it had

increased from $450.84 in 1977 to $840 in 1979, did

~ot

~esult

in any additional cost to the defendant by reason of the children of his first marriage inasmuch as defendant would have to
pay the same premium exactly for coveraqe for himself, his
second wife and his two children by his second marriage;

(3) the

disability insurance which defendant claimed he was carryingwas
a voluntary act and he was not, and is not now, required to

carr.~:

that insurance, and it cannot therefore be the basis of a change
of circumstances; and (4) the final item is the defendant's
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self-employment insurance, which has increased according to the
defendant's testimony to the sum of $1, 700 in 1979 from a figure
of $1,304 in 1977, an increase of $396.

We respectfully submit

that this is not a change of circumstances significant enough
to warrant a modification of the Decree.

It should further be

noted that everyone who is self-employed has had a similar
increase in their self-employment tax, and we believe that it
is not a valid ground for modification of the Decree anymore
than a general increase in the cost of living constitutes
grounds therefor.
It appears that the real reason defendant seeks a
modification of the provision for.additional child support
money is that he believes it is inequitable.

We respectfully

submit that it is not inequitable, and that the additional
amount of child support calculated for 1977 as set forth in
defendant's own exhibit D-1 (page 3 thereof) showing a supplemental child support of $1,980 is not unreasonable considering
his gross income of $92,359.

-

Although the defendant only shows

a net income that year of $31,324, if we add his wife's "sham"
income thereto, he had a net income of $39,324.
For the years 1972 through 1976, the total supplemental
child support amounted to the sum of $4,455.50 [as reduced to
judgment by Judge Winder (R.61)].

We do not believe that those

figures constitute an unconscionable result.

The Decree of

Divorce was stipulated to by the defendant with the advice of
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counsel.

It was entered into by the parties to enable the

children of the parties to participate in any increased earnings
of the defendant, and, although the children would not be living
in the defendant's home, the children would thereby be enabled
to enjoy some of the fruits of defendant's dental practice,
and would therefore in a very real sense be raised as the
children of a successful dentist, a status which the

~arties

felt the children were entitled to en]oy.
Now defendant appears to be dissatisfied

wit~

that

arrangement; but we respectfully submit that that is not
for modification.

grou~~

As was pointed out in Osmus v. Osmus, supra,

the defendant is not permitted to renege on a stipulation just
because he later feels dissatisfied therewith.

As

~oted

above,

the court there stated:
"A petition for modification is not a proper -.:vvay
to have changed the terms of an erroneous alimonv
decree
"
and in like fashion, it is not a proper way to
of the

Decree~of

POINT III.

cha~se

t~e

te=ms

Divorce with respect to child support.

THE ORDER OF MODIFICATION CAi~NOT BE SUPPORTED
WITHOUT FINDINGS OF FACT, OR AT LEAST A SUFFICIE~T
INDICATION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE BASIS FOR ITS
DECISION.
The decision of the Court in this case is f

Order Modifying Decree of Divorce found at R.130-131.

ou~d

in

a~

Prior

thereto, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision on December 14,
1979

(R.117).

-.
.
Neither of these documents contains any ril'"lc.ings
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of fact, nor do they reveal any basis for the Court's decision.
The case of Felt v. Felt, 27 Ut 2d 103, 493 P2d 620
(1972), held at page 108:
"We think the written findings in this case are
so fragmentary and unspecific as not to justify the
drastic elimination of any annual $12,000 award
except for a dollar and we so hold."
It appears to us that this court has thus held in
effect that sufficient findings of fact are necessary to support
a modification of a decree of divorce.

If this were not so, it

would be irrelevant whether the findings were "fragmentary and
unspecific" inasmuch as no findings would be required--fragmentary or otherwise.
It is true that Rule 52 (U.R.C.P.) provides that
findings are not necessary on motions, and that defendant has
denominated his pleading a motion.

We believe, hoWever, that

rule 52 was not intended to apply to cases which involve a prolonged and lengthy trial of contested issues, whether it is
technically denominated a "motion," "petition," or "complaint."
We believe that as it is used in that rule, a "motion" contemplates a proceeding which will be basically heard on matters of
law, or if facts are involved, will be largely handled by affidavit or minor evidentiary proceedings.
The instant case has all of the earmarks of a fullfledged trial:

It lasted two days and involved approximately

225 pages of testimony.
We believe, under the circumstances, the present
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proceeding was a trial, not a motion, and that findings of fact
were indeed necessary, or at the very least, some reasonable
indication by the Court of the basis for his decision.

POINT IV.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO UNDERTAKE TO DEFINE
THE TERM "FULLTIME STUDENT" IN THIS PROCEEDING.
The Court ruled that on the question of whether or

not the defendant was justified in withholding $166 per month
child support for the oldest child of the parties (on the
alleged basis that she was not a fulltirne student) was not
before the Court.

By so ruling, the Court precluded testimony

on that issue.
We believe it was error for the Court

t~

modify the

Decree by defining the term "fulltime student" without permitting the parties an opportunity to address that question-both factually and in argument.

The issue of whether any of

the children of the parties are fulltirne students under the
Decree should be resolved in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, which can only be developed at a proper
proceeding therefor.

To define that phrase in the abstract

without testimony or argument is unfair to the parties.

It is

in the nature of an "ex post facto law" when it is decreed
without reference to the facts of the case.

Even it it were

fair to the parties in the future to be governed by that definition (as the parties can govern themselves accordingly), it
is not fair to have that definition stated in the abstract and
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then applied without an opportunity to be heard.
If the parties are unable to resolve their differences
in that regard, an order to show cause hearing can be held to
determine the facts and circumstances, and the judge at that
hearing should apply the original Decree to the facts as they
are there developed.

At present we have a situation where a

judge defined a nterm" without hearing the facts, and that
definition will presumably be binding upon a judge who, at a
later time, is in a far better position to apply the Decree
to those facts, and that judge should not be bound in advance
of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully
requests the court to reverse the Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce entered by Judge Wilkinson on April 18, 1980.
Respectfully submitted:
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